Design 1047 Battlecruiser (1940)

Prospective Names: HLMNS Holland, Gelderland, Noordbrabant.

The Holland class Battlecruiser (Design 1047) remained one of the biggest what-if in the Netherlands naval history. As many other construction or paper projects in many navies by 1939-40 they were caught by the start of the war. These could have been the most formidable warhips ever in service to that point in the Koninklijke Marine, following projected dreadnoughts back in 1912. They had been designed to be sent in the East Indies with the KNIL and face the growing threat of the Imperial Japanese Navy, and would have been completed around 1943-44. Some authors described them as “Dutch Scharnhorsts” given their history and similarities, but they were not. And how they would have performed against the IJN ? Full story.

Original 1939 blueprints, src FB see below

Introduction

In the interwar, the Kon.Marine had no Dreadnought but ships closer to the Scandinavian coastal battleships and until 1938, the budget was jst lacking for such design. But by 1938, a new plan included a proposal to build three battlecruisers (actually rather fast battleships) approved by the parliament, aware of the IJN threat and especially recent bellicist Japanese demonstrations. Despite their enormous cost, these ships were studied in a very short time, but the lack of experience led to a partnership with the Third Reich and look at a ship like the Scharnhorst, to outclass any Japanese cruiser.

There was no question of opposing Japanese battleships, as it was believed they would be busy dealing wit the RN and USN. After final blueprints had been drawn, they were approved in February 1940. By Mayas Panzers already rolled on its borders, construction had yet to start, and orders to be placed. They had no official name, and their prospected completion was estimated for 1944. Potential names could be HLMNS Holland (launched 1943), Gelderland and Noordbrabant, with a big question mark over the shipyard facilities to build them. Nevesbu and IVS were the “Dutch” design officers in charge in 1939-40.

Development

Very early Dutch design, with a single funnel (1939)

Premices and Context

The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 showed the Dutch Colonial authorities of the East Indies, that increasing belligerence from the Japanese Empire, the security of its last lucrative colonies, rich of resources Japan lacked, could be next on the menu at some point. Java, Sumatra, Borneo and part of New Guinea had a considerable weight back home both politically and strategically. A population resided and traded there from three centuries, some 500,000 settlers considered this as a “second homeland” and the country needed these abundant and valuable resources, making for the large part of its gross domestic product.

Rubber plantations and oilfields received special attention in particular, making the Dutch, the world’s fourth-largest oil exporter behind USA, Iran, and Romania. To protect this was the KNIL, the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army, seconded by local assets of the Koninklijke Marine, by far larger there than back in Europe. There were also a few assets in the West Indies that could be called upon.

The Koninklijke Marine, agains the might of the IJN, had only one seagoing armored ship, HNLMS Soerabaja (ex-De Zeven Provinciën) but due to her age, she was considered to be of little combat value. There was a more active, outgoing force made of three more modern light cruisers Java and Sumatra (1921) and De Ruyter (brand new) with destroyers and many gunboats and minelayers while the main deterrence was its large submarine fleet. Plus there was still a possible last-minute alliance with the British, or even the French and US, which all had interests there and were equally concerned by an agressive Japan. It was believed that if war broke out, Japan’s capital ships would be more preoccupied by the US and RN, leaving the East Indies facing at most cruisers.

Still, the IJN cruiser were still far more powerful than their Dutch equivalents, which were light cruisers and none could undertake a Nachi or Takao class. Japan after 1936 was kknown to ignore the Washington and London treaties, so it was estimated by 1944, many new vessels would be ordered, so the five light cruisers of the Koninklijke Marine (the Tromp class were in construciton, launched 1937-38) would face an estimated 18 heavy and 27 light Japanese cruisers, an overwhelming force. Between mines and submarines in the many places where this could be put to good effect in and around the Islands, the cruisers could still protect minewsweepers and enter these waters anyway.

The Need for a Local Fleet in Being

July 1939 designs

The Koninklijke Marine was forced to massively increase its strenght, but had a limited budget. One concept that was popular in 1939-40 was the “super cruiser” a capital ship that would be capable of overpowering even the latest IJN heavy cruisers. The Washington Naval Treaty and London Naval Treaty limited these still to 10,000-ton displacement, 8-inch (20 cm) guns but the Netherlands never signed both and was unbound. Dutch naval intelligence had some confirmation that Japanese cruisers in 1939 were not part of exercises with the main capital fleet or fleet carriers and instead trained with seaplane carriers.

The latter had a limited air strike capability, so a battlecruiser would not have to face that danger. Thus, the naval staff was confimed that a fast (cruiser speed) large cruiser with heavier guns that could out-range the IJN 8-in guns would be ideal to create a fleet in being in the East Indies, delaying or even stopping such IJN cruiser offensive in support of an amphibious assault force. The force itself could act as a deterrence. The deadline was stup for 1944 to have these new planned capital ships, at least two.

Design Development

Drawing Z1 October 1939

To combat these Japanese treaty cruisers, the Koninklijke Marine prepared designs already by 1938, for a new class of “battlecruiser”, essentially a fast ship with a powerful artillery but still a protection against 8-inches shells. The design work was however hampered by the fact the Dutch had never designed a modern capital ship. This was reflected in a preliminary plan completed on 11 July 1939, missing many interwar tech advances and featuring an obsolete armor protection scheme. Eventually, the Netherlands entered discussion with Germany of all nations, because the latter had a ship already completing that had a design very close to what the Dutch needed: The Sccharnhorst class.

An agreement was reached, in whch Germany would release former plans and drawings prepared for that battlecruiser and in return, the Dutch would guarantee all required equipment ordered from German companies. German assistance changed the game, and produced a rough design by February 1940, just two months before the invasion of the low countries… Meanwhile a commissioned was sent to visit Italy that was said to have the best anti-torpedo protection design, forcing engineers to rethink the internal layout, leading to new drawings, dated 19 April 1940.

These were the last produced before the invasion and occupation of the Netherlands, leaving the Dutch East Indies alone and without its capital ships. Final plans were never completed, not order was ever placed in either the two major shipyards in the Netherlands at the time, which only one had the required dockyard (Rotterdam) large enough for these. Considerable investments would have been needed to create infrasstructure to built another. Germaniawerft’s designers amazingly dutifully continued working even by May until stopping. The first 1047 design class, still unnamed at that point, was scheduled to be completed in 1944, thus too late to stop the Japanese.

Design of the class

The design constantly evolved, from the purely Dutch design or 1938-39, to the German design from October 1939 to February-March 1940. Initially, the question remained largely open, even before a battlecruiser was adopted. Later, variations on earlier 1939 plans were presented by admirals and civil servants, politicians and the press also expressing opinions:
Battleships: The first idea in 1938 was the absolute favorite in the Dutch press but finances were just not there, the construction time estimated too great, and facilities were lacking.
Battlecruisers: Proposed in late 1938, great favorite among the technical committee and business sector, it was further developed as the best compromise.
Heavy cruisers: An idea popular with politicians and some admirals. Ultimately only the Eendracht class were effectively laid down.
Light cruisers: Popular with some civil servants and army personnel or politicians but not the navy, due to its low cost. Others suggested to just boost further the existing submarine fleet in the Dutch East Indies after initial German U-Boat successes. In the Dutch East Indies thermselves, many wanted the acquisition of an aircraft carrier.

1938 Initial Dutch Design

In late 1938, high-ranking naval officers of the Koninklijke Marine discussed improvements to the navy and concluded that a fleet in being was necessary, acting as a deterrent. The principle was that a potential adversary had to

“use such a large part of his military potential that there would be an unacceptable weakening of his capabilities in other theaters”.

This resulted in a note from the Chief of Naval Staff to the Minister of Defence J.C.C. van Dijk. He ordered the navy on 18 February 1939 to start planning and estimating costs for two or three “battlecruisers” (slagkruisers). They would form a key part of a naval rearmament program, “Dutch Battlecruiser Plan 1939”. This included at least two new escorting destroyers, seven submarines and several motor torpedo boats for the defence of the East Indies.

Requirements for the new battlecruiser were eventually laid down before the official order from van Dijk. Specs included the possibility of making a run of 12 hours at 32 knots, endurance of 4,500 nautical miles at 20 knots, acceleration in fifteen minutes from 20 to 30 knots, and full protection for the engine room. Given the island’s configuration and many shallow waters, draft need to not exceed 9 meters. They also needed six weeks supplies for prolongated operations.

The artillery choice was already directed at Germany and the Deutschland class, as it integrated from the start triple turrets with 280 mm guns. Each was to fire independently. The choice came from the pocket battleships example, that were design to outpower washington cruiser in range and caliber while still being light enough for a reasonable displacement overall, linked to the draft. The choice of three turrets instead of two to have at least six guns forward was also setup, reminiscent of the Scharnhorst class already completed at the time.

For the dual-purpose secondary armament, 120 mm guns were specified, in four twin mounts possibly of British origin or under local licence. The anti-aircraft battery was however setup to be of Dwedish origin, with fourteen 40 mm guns in pairs, and managed by a centralized fire control. The ships also needed reconnaissance by default of a radar, not even planned, and at least two reconnaissance seaplanes and facilities. Hower two “fighters” were also precised (see later). Specific values were dependend of the choice of armor, but the accent was on a superior anti-torpedo and mine protection as well as to resist similar 28 cm shells and 300 kg bombs, despite the fact they were only required to resist Japanese 20cm or 8-inches shells.

However the first draft completed by the Construction Department on 11 July 1939 was clearly out of touch with the latest technical developments in capital ship design, in particular armour layout lessons from the battle of Jutland. The planned armor scheme was just obsolete, based on 1913 initial schemes. For example, the new battlecruiser lacked deck armor or good underwater protection, they would have been easy meat for aviation or submarines. Since 1913 Dutch plans for 24,650-ton dreadnoughts never happened due to the First World War, there was no prior experience for capital ships. In fact, the Dutch design teams lacked any source of information on large modern warships, and only drew on available and unclassified or public sources like Jane’s Fighting Ships. This of course did not said anything about precise data on many aspects of design that could not be invented.

1939 Initial German Design

Thus, the Dutch turned to foreign sources for technical assistance. First, the French. Negociations started to relese plans for the Dunkerque class. But the French, weary these would end in German hands, refused. The British were not consulted as they had no plans for similar ships. Next, the Dutch turned to Germany and their ally Italy. Since the 1920s there has been already a German design firm in Rotterdam, IVS, a front for German companies to continue development of submarines in secret.

So, informal talks already were held in Berlin on 24–25 April 1939. The Dutch proposed a deal, providing them the full Scharnhorst-class battleship plans in exchange for lucrative contracts for all the equipments needed. However the two sides could not agree on terms. Later a German delegation came in the Netherlands, but they insisted that orders would be placed in Germany as well as even more financial compensation to German companies of the construction wa scancelled. No complete set of plans for the Scharnhorsts would be transmitted, as probably some worried they would en similarly in French hands. The Dutch Cabinet also failed to agree on any deal during the summer of 1939.

Dutch planners however went ahead and managed to gain a contract with Ferrostaal A.G. Essen. On 15 May 1939 many products to be purchased in Germany was submitted and July talks were held in Bremen and Berlin (13, 31 July). It was obtained that plans and drawings would be produced, albeit not specifically of the Scharnhorst-class and rather rely on the Dutch battlecruiser design as less risky in case of a leak. These initial plans were delivered on 21 August 1939, and integrated modern protection schemes.

On 4 October 1939, a German admiral appointed as liaison asserted that Germany could not guarantee a delivery date but assured of his pressure on companies to meet contractual dates and that the Kriegsmarine would not interfere (or worse, requisition the ship in case of war). In November, Ferrostaal A.G. of Essen became the official main company for the Dutch to deal with other companies in Germany but that did not include Germaniawerft.

Indeed the latter was contracted separately, to work on armament for the new battlecruisers, after a meeting alreday back on 31 July 1939. All the characteristics for the main and secondary armament as well as turret armor and the values of depression and elevation (10–45° with hydraulic power) or the muzzle velocity of the guns planned, 28 cm at 850–900 m/s (2,800–3,000 ft/s) were agreed upon, as well as a secondary armament that could depreqs to -10°, or elevate to 80° as well as assorted protection (80 mm front, 150 mm roof, 50 mm sides) plus revisions of the fire, which arrangement was agreed upon on 6 November 1939. NV Hazemeyer Signaal Apparatenfabriek back at home would just built the equipments from Germanawerft plans.

The propulsion plant was the great unknown. Many wanted to have it built in the Netherlands, just taking four of the steam turbines used already on the new Eendracht cruisers and just doubling the number of boilers. Requirements were prepared and released in August 1939 specifying eight boiler rooms and four sets of geared turbines with HP and LP stages, for c180,000 shp. NEVESBU and two others, Germaniawerft for the turbines and Deschimag for the boilers were however contracted after the German-Dutch agreements. NEVESBU (a Dutch naval design firm) sketched preliminary plans for the hull and internal sections, incorporated into two other different design studies. One was a complete setup by Nevesbu, the other by NV Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw (IvS) we already talked about. So it was officially Dutch but in reality German.

IvS became the one office that linked Dutch and German designers (at least for the parliament), but they drew heavily on the Ship Construction Office of the German Navy. On 31 August however their drafts were criticized by the Dutch design commission as not given enough machinery room or magazines. The Nevesbu design from 11 July was merged with IvS design, and the latter onlk came out with more plans by 11 March 1940, discussed in April.

1940 Design Reviews

10 February 1940 Nevesbu design

By December 1939 the two studies led to separate design proposals, both powered by 180,000 shp with same powerplant configuration, but the “Dutch” design had a machinery space of 199 m2 (2,140 sq ft) so roomier than for the German. Doubts over the Germans small boiler rooms were retorspectively justified given the many issues suffered by the Kriegsmarine during the war, far more than any other belligerent. The problem was the placement of the ammunition magazine behind the bulkheads of the citadel, for which 84 m (276 ft) of length for propulsion plant, had to be restcrited to 72.8 m (239 ft). This made the German proposal to had them under 74 m (243 ft) versus 78 m (256 ft) more appealing in the end.

However the same month, a new Navy Minister was appointed, which preferred to just acquire a Dutch-designed old-school armored cruiser, a ship capable of 29 knots (33 mph; 54 km/h) for a displacement of 16,000-long-ton (16,257 t; 17,920-short-ton) standard and armed with nine 24 cm (9.4 in) guns (three triple turrets) for a 175 mm (6.9 in) belt, a 75 mm (3.0 in) deck. However engineers believed that too many compromises were present in the design still showing inadequate protection against aviation and submarines and having not speed advantage so the Navy eventually “strongly recommended” to stick with the ongoing battlecruiser, eventually authorized at last officially in February 1940 with two light cruisers of the Eendracht class for the East Indies.

The new light cruisers were official replacement for the Java class, that would be kept as gunnery training ships and replaced the very old cruiser Gelderland. However for thes enew battlecruisers to be maintained in such tropical waters, there was no facilities. So the plan also inclucled a new 40,000-ton floating dock for Soerabaya, and to build a new 250 m (820 ft) building way by the Netherlands Construction Company, Ltd. Germany at this point still refuse to give any blueprints regarding the ASW protection, so the Dutch sent a delegation to Italy for assistance in February 1940, but they were denied access to the decumentation of Roma in construction.

The Italians were adamant to keep the Pugliese system secret, however they could see Vittorio Veneto and tour shipyards, interviewing even the Chief Constructor of the Italian Navy and get extra bits about the Scharnhorsts from the Italians, that had extra knowledge. However overall the mission was a failure as the Dutch were not much inspired.
It still however trigerred a complete redesign of the internal subdivision, dropping the initial central longitudinal bulkhead, and proposed to raise the double bottom against magnetic torpedoes but this was cancelled due to the shallow draft spec. Another delegation was sent to Germany with their latest design from 19 April 1940, final version before the invasion. In that regard, Design 1047 remained incomplete but at lest gave us final specs.

Hull and general design (19 April 1940)

Final design 18 March Drawing H-79 Project 323-2
The final design 1047 of April 1940 had a standard displacement of 28,482 tonnes (28,032 long tons). Trial displacement was 29,784 tonnes and “normal load” displacement 31,396 tonnes, Washington displacement 27,988 tons. The ship was now set to be between 236 meters between perpendicular (774 ft) and 241.20 meters overall (791 ft) and 29.4 m (96 ft) outside armor, 30.85 m (101.2 ft) at the upper deck with armour in beam, for a draft maintaned at 7.8 m (26 ft) on trials. The moulded depth was 14m.

Now about the general outlook. The drawings shows quite different superstructure designs, which are worth discussing. They all had the same general outlines with on the Dutch plans always a central tower running through the bridge structures, on which top sat the main FC tower. The CT was firher forward and lower, just clearing the roof of B turret. The German H-79 Project 323-2 showed a completely different animal, much closer in many aspects to the Schanhorst like the tripod mainmast mast and another two-tiered bridge with a tower close to the Graf Spee and Scheer rather than Scharnhorst, plus the clipper bow, fine clipper poop and stern ad finer entry lines. However the final Dutch design was a mixture of IVS and Nevesbu, and the mainmast is next to the bridge. The poop and stern designs are closer to British cruiser designs (like the County class) and the stem has a moderate slope. The hull lines are also fuller, also closer to British designs like the King Georges V.

Powerplant (as of 19 April 1940)

The propulsion was never fully finalized. By March 1940 if the figure of 160,000 shp was a baseline, it was undestood that in warmler climates and waters, if 180,000 shp was achieved, they would be ca. 200,000 shp in reality. Eight Yarrow boilers were planned, fitted in four boiler rooms, then four Parsons geared turbines in two engine rooms and four 3-bladed bronze fixed pitch propellers for either 40,000 or 45,000 shp each. The machinery room was altered, last in 20 April 1940 for a lenght of 79.5 meters. The beam did not changed due to the need of some ASW protection amargin. Speed estimation was 34 knots, but range was left to pure speculation as well as oil bunkerage. Some authors gave figures that were close to the Scharnhorst class.

Protection (as of 19 April 1940)

This was the most discussed topic, generating the most blueprints. Fixed in 20 April 1940, it showed the following:

Main side belt: 225 mm (9 in) with 72° slope
Upper side belt: 40 mm (1.6 in)
Longitudinal anti-torpedo bulkhead: 40 mm (1.6 in)
Upper deck: 20 mm (0.79 in)
Main armored deck: 100 mm (4 in) on 15 mm (0.59 in) deck plating
Lower deck: 30 mm (1 in)
Boiler uptakes: 225 mm (8.9 in) gratings (main deck) and 75 mm (3.0 in) (lower deck)
Underwater protection: Bulge below main side belt (depth 1.5 m (4.9 ft))
Conning tower: 150 mm (5.9 in)
Steering compartment: 150 mm (5.9 in)
Steering compartment main deck: 125 mm (4.9 in)
Armored bulkhead: 40 mm (1.6 in)
Barbettes for main turrets: 250 mm (10 in) above upper deck; 200 mm (7.9 in)
Barbette between main and upper decks; 40 mm (1.6 in)
Barbettes for secondary armament: 75 mm (3.0 in)
Barbette above upper deck; 60 mm (2.4 in)

Armament (as of 16 February 1940)

Lt. Jurrien S. Noot reconstruction for the armament on 19 April 1940 does not give specifics, most authors agree that they were likely unchanged since 16 February 1940, showing the following:

3×3 283 mm guns

Work for the main armament was contracted to Germaniawerft, which just retook the same turrets of the Deutschland and Scharhnorst, with guns marked as 28 cm SK C/34 similar to the Scharnhorst class and either rebored to 283 mm in caliber, or just a ploy to fool western powers and divert attention to the fact the Dutch were purchasing German armament. If the case, the base APC shell weighted 315 kg (694 lb) with a muzzle velocity of 900 m/s (2,950 ft/s), maximum range 42,600 meters (46,600 yards). See the Scharnhorst artillery for more. The ships had 120 rounds stowed for each and were capable of 2.5 rounds per minute, with cradles allowing an elevation of 45° but at a loading angle of 2°. Despite their moderate caliber they outranged by far any Washington cruiser, and that was the point. The turrets were located the same way as in Scharnhorst, A and B forward and superfiring, X on deck aft.

6×2 120mm Bofors

The secondary armament comprised twelve 120 mm (4.7 in) dual purpose mounted guns in dual “turrets” (large masks open to the rear) and there were interrogations about these being the older version used on Dutch destroyers or a brand new one. No range or rate of fire known, but they would have been likely updated. These turrets were located on deck amidship in a similar arrangement as on the Scharnhorst class. They had a traverse of up to 107° and 40° elevation, with 200 provided rounds, per gun.

AA Armament

The ship would have had also fourteen 40 mm Bofors guns all in twin mounts. They were similar as those on the after superstructure of De Ruyter in 1939 and integrated the hazemeyer stabilizaiton system, so very efficient. They were localized at (on the 1939 drawings) mostly around the bridge base at four corners, and two more abaft the rear funnel. These models, from which the WW2 guns derived, were first installed when Java and Sumatra were refitted in 1934–35.

Eight single 20 mm guns Oerlikon 20 mm AA guns under flat shields completed this. Localization is uncertain, they are not shown on the 9 February drafts but would have been placed in various deck and structure position amidship. October 1939 drafts however shows some positions, notably three around a bridge platform high up, just below the fire control tower. Tow more are located on the corner of the structure aft of the second funnel close to “X” turret.

Fire Control & Sensors

By 1944 when completed, the design certainly was badly in need of radars. The most likely supplier, if planned from the start, would have been Germany given the agreement of February 1940. By 1944, and that’s highly prospective, ore likely British or US. No sensor appears on the plans. The ships whowever did showed a fire control system of course. Plans states a centralized fire control inside the hull coupled with several rangefinders, two main artillery ones on top of the bridge tower and another aft between the second funnel and X turret. Two more fire control towers are shown aft of the bridge on an upper platform for the secondary armament. It seems this configuration remained the same in all designs.

Air Group

Aircraft were to be two “fighters” and two reconnaissance aircraft. Plans shows clearly indeed a hangar aft of the forefunnel, at leas large enough for two side by side, and two gooseneck cranes to operate these, and a fixed, transverse catapult, typical or RN and German ships. The plans of 1940 shows a biplane and the associated silhouette shows what was likely the standard Fokker C.XI. See the page for more. As for the “fighter” either it was a “one way ticket” model that had to land somewhere after launch, made easier by the many islands and beaches in the east indies, or a fighter seaplane. But none was in service at that point. The most likely candidated was a seaplane conversion of the Fokker D.XXI. However no such variant was ever ordered. The Finns managed to add articulated skis on their own, so a field conversion was not impossible.

No, these were not Dutch Scharnhorsts: They were better.

A photoshopping of Fr05ty, shipcomrade.com 2017

Despite superficial similarities, differences were aplenty between the two designs. Especially the last version of the Dutch design. Design 1047 was truly a battlecruiser and not a fast battleship, whereas Dunkerque and Scharhorst were close to a fast battleship due to the armor protection scheme. Some aspects opf the latter were far superior however, like the main guns on Design 1047 that could elevate 5° higher, an Italian style thicker anti-torpedo system, a better deck protection and better management of the ship boilers.

Plus a quadruple shaft rather as a twon or triple one improved redundancy in combat. More so, the Dutch by refusing to adopt a German powerplant for an all-British one saved them from considerable troubles. It is argued also that the secondary battery, twelve 120 mm (4.7 in) dual purpose guns is also vastly improved compared to the Scharnhorst class split between pure A/S 150 mm and pure AA 105 mm. This simplified logistics considerably. So overall, ever if its remained at paper stage, a better design still.

Author’s illustration, what-if completed

⚙ Design 1047 specifications
Displacement	27,988 tonnes (27,546 long tons; 30,851 short tons) standard
Dimensions	241.2 x 29.4 x 7.8m (791 x 96 x 26 ft)
Propulsion	4-shaft geared turbines, 8 boilers 160-180,000 hp est.
Speed	34 knots est.
Range	No data, oil bunkerage unknown. est. c6-7,000 nm/19 kts
Armament	3×3 283 mm, 6×2 120 mm/45, 7×2 40 mm Bofors, 8× 20 mm Oerlikon
Protection	225mm belt, 100mm deck, 150mm CT, 60mm barbettes, 40mm bulkheads
Air Group	Likely 2x Fokker C9 seaplanes
Crew	Est. 900-1,000 officers and ratings

HNLMS Holland

Prospective name often cited, final design unready by May 1940, not ordered, laid down on built. Prospective laying down at Koninklijke Maatschappij De Schelde, Vlissingen in June-July 1940.

HNLMS Gelderland

Prospective name often cited, final design unready by May 1940, not ordered, laid down on built. Prospective laying down at Nederlandsche Scheepsbouw Maatschappij, Amsterdam in 1941 after completion of a new slipway.

HNLMS Nordbrabant

Prospective name often cited, final design unready by May 1940, not ordered, laid down on built. Prospective laying down in 1942 after the launch of HNLMS Holland likely at Koninklijke Maatschappij De Schelde. Possible completion date c1945.